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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 0024

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CH, UR

SUBJECT: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

REF: A. USNATO 005

B. STATE 279828

C. STATE 279533

D. USNATO 7053

1. MISSION TRANSMITS HERewith TEXT OF THE SECOND REVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF PAPER ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. BE BELIEVE THIS REVISION REPRESENTS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER EARLIER DRAFTS, IN PARTICULAR BECUASE IT CONCLUDES WITH FINAL PARAGRAPH TAKEN FROM U.S. CONTRIBUTION (REF C). LATEST REVISION IS STILL IN OUR OPINION TOO CHRONOLOGICAL (AND THUS TO LONG) AND MAY OVEREMPHASIZE CHINESE PERCEPTION OF BREZHNEV AS THEIR MAIN ENEMY IN SOVIET POLITBURO (SEE PARAGRPHS 7 AND 23).

2. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON PREVIOUS DRAFT (REF B)
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ANDDESIRABILITY OF HAVING POLITICAL COMMITTEE COMPLETE WORK ON THIS PAPER WHILE NOVEMBER EXCHANGES BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING ARE STILL TOPICAL, MISSION RECOMMENDS THAT U.S. APPROVE THIS SECOND REVISION. ACTION REQUESTED:

DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS IN TIME FOR JANUARY 7 POLADS MEETING.
BEGIN TEXT.

SUMMARY

THE CHINESE MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION MARKING THE 57TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION WAS CONSIDERABLY LONGER AND MORE DETAILED THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. IN PARTICULAR, IT CONTAINS A REFERENCE TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN SEPTEMBER 1969 (MEETING OF KOSYGIN WITH CHOU EN-LAI AT PEKING AIRPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONCLUDED ON THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO ON THE BORDER, THE PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE TWO SIDES' ARMED FORCES IN THE DISPUTED AREAS; THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE, INTER ALIA, FOR MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND PAVE THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT RESOLVING THE BORDER PROBLEM AS A WHOLE. IN SUBSTANCE, THESE PROPOSALS ARE NOT NEW. IT WAS ALREADY KNOWN THAT CHINA WAS UNWILLING TO "NEGOTIATE UNDER DURESS" AND THAT IN ITS VIEW "CONCRETE GUARANTEES" (WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, ETC.) WERE AN ESSENTIAL ADJUNCT TO THE UNDERTAKINGS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION (NON-AGGRESSION AND NON-USE OF FORCE AGREEMENTS) AND A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY BORDER NEGOTIATIONS.

2. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH DELIVERED ON 26TH NOVEMBER IN ULAN BATOR PROVIDED FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT THE SOVIET POSITION HAD NOT UNDERGONE ANY SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION. HIS STRONG ADVOCACY OF THE CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY WAS SKILLFULLY HANDLED SO AS TO DE-EMPHASIZE THE USSR'S ROLE, THEREBY ATTEMPTING TO DISPEL SUSPICION THAT THE SCHEME IS LARGELY AN ANTI-CHINESE MANOEUVRE. ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, BREZHNEV'S REJECTION OF CHINESE "PRECONDITIONS" TO FURTHER BORDER TALKS INDICATED THAT IT WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO REPEAT AND SPELL OUT SOVIET POLICY QUICKLY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO DEMONSTRATE THE "REASONABLENESS" OF THE SOVIET POSITION AND TO RECOUP ANY GROUND WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN LOST IN WHAT WAS BECOMING LARELY A PROPAGANDA SKIRMISH.
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(LATER THE SAME DAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO THE CHINESE MESSAGE ALONG PARALLEL LINES.)

3. BREZHNEV'S SHARP REJECTION OF CHINA'S APPROACH FOLLOWED BY A CHINESE ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION OVER MONGOLIA HAVE DAMPENED ANY HOPE OF A SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT.

4. THE SOVIETS MAY SINCERELY HOPE FOR A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS AND WELCOME ANY REDUCTION IN PRC POLEMICS, BUT WITHOUT HAVING ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE CHANCES OF A MARKED IMPROVEMENT ON THE BORDER ISSUE. THEY PROBABLY SEE THE LATEST CHINESE STATEMENT AS AN ADMISSION THAT THE TACTIC OF CONSTANTLY ATTACKING THE USSR WAS NOT WINNING FREINDS IN THE THIRD WORLD.

5. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE CHINESE SERIOUSLY EXPECTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT THEIR PROPOSALS AS LONG AS THEY ARE STILL LINKED WITH "WITHDRAWAL" OR, AS THE CHINESE NOW CALL IT, THE "DISENGAGEMENT" OF FORCES ON THE BORDER. THE CHINESE MESSAGE WAS INTENDED TO SHOW THE WORLD THAT CHINA WAS NOT TOTALLY UNCOMPROMISING ON THIS ISSUE AND WAS TIMED TO REMIND SOVIET AND AMERICAN LEADERS MEETING VLADIVOSTOK OF CHINA'S PLACE IN ASIAN AFFAIRS.

6. FOR BOTH SIDES INTER-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS REMAIN THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE DISPUTE. WITH A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE COMING UP AND GIVEN THE SOVIET DESIRE TO ORGANIZE A WORLD COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE, WHICH THE SOVIETS MIGHT WISH TO USE FOR ANTI-CHINESE PURPOSES, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT MUCH PROGRESS, IF ANY, IS POSSIBLE IN RESOLVING THE SINO-SOVIET QUARREL.

7. THE RECENT EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES AND PRONOUNCEMENTS MAY HAVE EVEN HAD THE EFFECT OF INCREASING MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND ANTAGONISMS AND THE CHINESE FOR THEIR PART APPEAR TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS DESIRE NEITHER SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS NOR INDEED THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN MONGOLIA HAS NOW EVIDENTLY MARKED HIM AS THE ENEMY OF CHINA IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO.

8. SEVERAL SPEECHES AND CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES MADE DURING RECENT MONTHS HAVE RESULTED IN INTERESTING AND POSSIBLY CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPORTANT NUANCES IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. INITIAL SPECULATION IN SOME QUARTERS THAT A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING WAS IN THE OFFING HAS GIVEN WAY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE BASIC POSITIONS OF EACH HAS NOT CHANGED AND POSSIBLY MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND ANTAGONISMS HAVE EVEN INCREASED.

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I. SINO-SOVIET SIGNALS

9. ON THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PRC (1ST OCTOBER) THE USSR SENT A TELEGRAM CONGRATULATING "THE CHINESE PEOPLE", WHICH REFLECTED LITTLE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN RELATIONS. THE ISSUE OF CHINA'S PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT RECEIVED EXTENSIVE TREATMENT, HOWEVER; SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR TREATIES CONCERNING NON-AGGRESSION AND NON-USE OF FORCE AND SETTLEMENT OF FRONTIER QUESTIONS WERE ALSO EMPHASIZED. IT WAS CONCEDED THAT THE CHINESE REVOLUTION WAS "A COMPONENT PART OF THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS".

10. IN A SPEECH AT FRUNZE ON 2ND NOVEMBER, KOSYGIN TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS NEARNESS TO THE CHINESE FRONTIER TO MAKE A NUMBER OF REMARKS ON RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. ALTHOUGH THESE COMMENTS WERE NOT SUBSTANTIVELY NEW, THEY NONE THE LESS FOCUSED ON THE PROSPECTS FOR NORMALIZATION. HE STATED THAT THE USSR WAS DOING EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO MAKE THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF ITS BORDER WITH CHINA A BOUNDARY OF PEACE, GOOD NEIGHBOURLY
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CO-OPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP. THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA WAS TO PERMANENT POSITION THAT WAS NOT DEPENDENT ON TEMPORARY FACTORS. IF NORMALIZATION HAD NOT BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY RESTED WITH PEKING MOST REACTIONARY FORCES AND SOUGHT EVERYWHERE TO DAMAGE THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM. KOSYGIN NEVERTHELESS EXPRESSED THE RELIEF THAT IN FUTURE THIS SITUATION WOULD CHANGE; BECAUSE OF THE WILL OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE, THE PRC WOULD ADVANCE IN A UNITED FRONT WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE ROAD TO PEACE AND SOCIALISM.

11. THE PASSAGE DEVOTED TO CHINA IN MR. GROMYKO'S NATIONAL DAY ADDRESS WAS HARsher IN TONE BUT SUBSTANTIVELY REAFFIRM THE SOVIET POSITION. GROMYKO ACCUSED CHINA OF UNITING WITH IMPERIALIST REACTION TO OBSTRUCT THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION. WHILE THE USSR WOULD CONTINUE TO REPULSE THESE EFFORTS, HE DECLARED, IT WOULD GO ON STRIVING FOR NORMAL RELATIONS AND, INDEED WOULD DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO ACHIEVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR

OSTENTATIOUSLY LEFT THE HASS AS SOON AS GROMYKO BEGAN HIS REMARKS ON CHINA. BOTH KOSYGIN AND GROMYKO DREW ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM.

12. THE CHINESE MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION MARKING THE 57TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION WAS CONSIDERABLY LONGER AND MORE DETAILED THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. IN PARTICULAR, IT CONTAINS A REFERENCE TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN SEPTEMBER 1969 (MEETING OF KOSYGIN WITH CHOU EN-LAI AT PEKING AIRPORT) TO THE EFFECT THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONCLUDED ON THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO ON THE BORDER, THE PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE TWO SIDES' ARMED FORCES IN THE DISPUTED AREA; THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE, INTER ALIA, FOR MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND PAVE THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT RESOLVING THE BORDER PROBLEM AS A WHOLE.

13. IN SUBSTANCE, THESE PROPOSALS ARE NOT NEW. IT WAS ALREADY KNOWN THAT CHINA WAS UNWILLING TO "NEGOTIATE UNDER DURESS" AND THAT IN ITS VIEW "CONCRETE GUARANTEES" (WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, ETC.) WERE AN ESSENTIAL ADJUNCT TO THE GUARANTEES TO THE UNDERTAKINGS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION (NON-AGGRESSION
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AND NON-USE OF FORCE AGREEMENTS) AND A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY BORDER NEGOTIATIONS..

14. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THEREFORE THAT GROMYKO SHOULD HAVE BACKED AWAY FROM KOSYGIN'S EMPHASIS ON A BORDER OF PEACE AND INSTEAD HAVE LAID INCREASED WEIGHT ON THE NEED FOR THE CHINESE TO STOP CONSORTING WITH THE IMPERIALISTS. THE IMPRESSION OF DEFENSIVENESS LEFT BY GROMYKO'S REMARKS IS STRENGTHENED BY THE TREATMENT GIVEN IN THE SOVIET NEWSPAPERS TO THE CHINESE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SOVIET NATIONAL DAY. ALL THAT WAS PUBLISHED WAS A PARAPHRASE OF THE TEXT WHICH REPLACED THE SPECIFIC CHINESE PROPOSALS WITH A SENTENCE STATING THE MESSAGE HAD SET OUT THE KNOWN POSITION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS. THE SOVIET PRESS ALSO DROPPED THE WORD "GREAT" IN REFERENCE TO THE "GREAT SOVIET PEOPLE".

15. IN A SPEECH IN ASHKABAD ON 18TH NOVEMBER, POLITBURO MEMBER KIRILENKO, WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE CHINESE MESSAGE DIRECTLY, MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO SHIFT IN THE SOVIET POSITION. HE DID SO IN TERMS THAT WERE PARALLEL TO, BUT SOMEWHAT HARDER, THAN THOSE USED BY GROMYKO ON 6TH NOVEMBER AND NOTICEABLY HARsher THAN THOSE OF KOSYGIN ON 2ND NOVEMBER. KIRILENKO DECLARED IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE LEADERS OF THE PRC NOT INFREQUENTLY WERE FOUND IN THE RANKS OF THE OPPONENTS OF DETENTE, ANTI-SOVIETS OF VARIOUS STRIPES AND ENEMIES OF SOCIALIST CO-OPERATION. THE SOVIET POSITION ON RELATIONS WITH THE PRC AND THE PRESENT POLICY OF ITS LEADERS WAS WELL KNOWN;

IT HAD BEEN SET OUT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS BY PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS. IN ESSENCE IT WAS A DECISIVE AND PRINCIPLED REBUFF OF ANTI-SOVIET SLANDER AND HOSTILE INTRIGUES DIRECTED AGAINST THE CPSU AND THE USSR, AS WELL AS ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES; THIS POSITION EXPRESSED AS WELL A CONSTANT WILLINGNESS FOR BUSINESSLIKE NEGOTIATIONS AND A GENUINE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS ON A PRINCIPLED BASIS. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS FOUNDED ON THE DECISION OF 24TH PARTY CONGRESS AND REMAINED UNCHANGED.

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16. THUS, IN HIS 25TH NOVEMBER SPEECH IN ULAN BATOR, MR. BREZHNEV MADE NO NEW PROPOSALS AND SIMPLY REITERATED THE POSITIONS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SOVIET LEADERS. MOSCOW ACCORDINGLY APPEARS TO BE CONTENT TO ADHERE TO A "WAIT AND SEE" POLICY. HIS STRONG ADVOCACY OF THE CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY WAS SKILLFULLY HANDLED SO AS TO DE-EMPHASIZE THE USSR'S ROLE, THEREBY ATTEMPTING TO DISPEL SUSPICION THAT THE SCHEME IS LARGELY AN ANTI-CHINESE MANOEUVRE. THIS WAS ACHIEVED BY TRACING THE ROOT, IDEAS AND PRINCIPLES FOR SUCH A SYSTEM AS HAVING BEEN PUT FORWARD BY MANY COUNTRIES WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE AREA, INCLUDING THE PRC. ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, BREZHNEV'S REJECTION OF CHINESE "PRECONDITIONS" TO FURTHER BORDER TALKS, FOLLOWING KIRILENKO'S EARLIER MORE INDIRECT REFERENCES TO THE CHINESE OVERTURES, INDICATED THAT IT WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO REPEAT AND SPELL OUT SOVIET POLICY QUICKLY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO DEMONSTRATE THE "REASONABLENESS" OF THE SOVIET POSITION AND TO RECOUP ANY GROUND WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN LOST IN WHAT WAS BECOMING LARGELY A PROPAGANDA SKIRMISH. LATER THE SAME DAY THE

SOVIET GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO THE CHINESE MESSAGE ALONG PARALLEL
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LINES.

17. THE CHINESE DID NOT TAKE LONG TO REACT. ON 27TH NOVEMBER HSIN HUA MADE A FIERCE ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS "ECONOMIC PLUNDER" OF OUTER MONGOLIA. THE USSR WAS ACCUSED OF STRANGLING MONGOLIA'S NATIONAL INDUSTRY, PLUNDERING THE COUNTRY'S MINERAL RESOURCES, INTERFERING WITH ECONOMIC PLANNING, THUS BECOMING AN ECONOMIC OVERLOAD. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A SALVO FROM TASS THE NEXT DAY THAT ACCUSED THE CHINESE OF HARBOURING "GREAT POWER AMITIONS" AND REITERATED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT THE CHINESE ATTITUDE HINDERED DETENTE BETWEEN THEM BY PLACING OBSTACLES IN THE FORM OF PRECONDITIONS IN THE WAY OF IMPORVED RELATIONS.

II. INTERPRETING THESE SINO-SOVIET SIGNALS

18. ACCORDING TO THE PRC EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, THE CHINESE HAD DECIDED TO MAKE USE OF THE CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO REASSERT THEIR POSITION ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH HAD BEEN STATED SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE, NOTABLY IN CHOU'S SPEECH AT THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS, AND TO MAKE PUBLIC FOR THE FIRST TIME THE FACT THAT IN THEIR VIEW THIS POSITION CORRESPONDED TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN KOSYGIN AND CHOU EN-LAI IN SPETEMBER 1969 BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS HAD FOR YEARS BEEN PUTTING FORWARD PARTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING THEY FAVOURED AS A SOVIET PROPOSAL AND USING IT TO PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE. THE PARTICULAR INCIDENT THAT PRECIPITATED THE CHINESE DECISION WAS THE INCLUSION IN THE SOVIET CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE FOR THE CHINESE NATIONAL DAY ON 1ST OCTOBER OF A PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCLUSION OF NON-AGGRESSION AND NON-USE OF FORCE TREATIES. THE CHINESE MAINTAIN THAT THE PLEDGES OF NON-AGGRESSION AND RENNUCIATION OF FORCE WERE TO FORM PART OF THE PACKAGE TO BE NEGOTIATED UNDER THE 1969 UNDERSTANDING. THE WORDING AND STYPLE OF THE CHINESE CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE MIRROR THOSE OF THE SOVIET MESSAGE. ALTHOUGH THE PRC EMBASSY HAS NOT SAID SO, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE CHINESE WERE INFLUENCED IN THEIR DECISION TO MAKE THE 1969 UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC BY THE RESUMTION AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER OF THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN FOR AN ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM, WHICH SEEMS INTENDED AMONG OTHER THINGS TO UDERCUT THE 1969 AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE BOUNDARY QUESTIONS.

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19. THE CHINESE OBJECTIVE IN SENDING THIS APPARENTLY CONCILIATORY MESSAGE WAS PROBABLY TO GAIN THE UPPER HAND IN THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE OF APPEARING REASONABLE. THEY HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO DRAW THE ATTENTIION OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN

PEKING AND MOSCOW TO THEIR MESSAGE. THE CHINESE PROBABLY WISH TO IMPROBE THEIR IMAGE PRIOR TO THE PROPOSED MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN 1975 AND FORESTALL ATTEMPTS BY THE RUSSIANS, IN THAT AND OTHER CONTEXTS, TO LABEL THEM AS "INTRANSIGENT". THEY MAY ALSO HAVE WISHED TO PLACE ON RECORD AN APPARENTLY REASONABLE POSITION IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE SOVIET-UNITED STATES SUMMIT MEETING IN VLADIVOSTOK AND TO SUGGEST TO THE UNITED STATES THAT SINO-SOVIET HOSTILITY MIGHT NOT, PERHAPS, BE A PERMANENT PHENOMENON, THEREBY REMINDING BOTH COUNTRIES OF CHINA'S PLACE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. FURTHERMORE, THE CHINESES MIGHT HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT THEIR EFFORTS TO GAIN INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD BY TRYING TO EXCLUDE THE USSR WERE NOT SUCCEEDING THROUGH THE TACTIC OF CONSTANTLY ATTACKING THE USSR. THEREFORE THERE MIGHT BE A CHINESE DECISION TO ADOPT A LESS INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE TO THE USSR. HOWEVER, THEIR ANTI-SOVIET AIMS REMAINED THE SAME.

20. THE SOVIETS SEEM TO HAVE HAD A SCEPTICAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CHINESE PROPOSAL FROM THE OUTSET. IN THE ALMOST THREE WEEKS BETWEEN RECEIPT OF THE PRC MESSAGE AND THE 26 TH NOVEMBER REJECTION, SOVIET OFFICIALS STRONGLY EXPRESSED NEGATIVE VIEWS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN PRIVATE. IN ANY CASE, THE PUBLIC SURFACING BY BOTH SIDES OF THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS IN THE BORDER TALKS IS PROBABLY INDICATIVE MORE OF A PUBLIC POSTURING FOR EFFECT THAN OF PROGRESS IN THE TALKS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, MAY HAVE DELAYED THEIR OFFICIAL NEGATIVE RESPONSE UNTIL AFTER THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT TO LESSEN THE INTANGIBLE BUT REAL IMPACT OF THE CHINA FACTOR IN THE US-SOVIET DELIBERATIONS.

III. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

21. WHILE THE MOST HIGHLY PUBLICIZED ASPECTS OF THESE RECENT SINO-SOVIET EXCHANGES HAVE CENTRED ON MATTERS RELATING TO BORDER PROBLEMS, THESE ARE REALLY THE "TIP OF THE ICEBERG" AND PROGRESS ON THEM WILL LIKELY REQUIRE PROGRESS IN THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL OR EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, THE INTER-PARTY SPHERES. CONFIDENTIAL

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THIS WOULD SEEM UNLIKELY FROM THE CHINESE SIDE BEFORE SOME OF CHINA'S STATE AND LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS ARE SETTLED, AT THE EARLIEST BY THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, AND MORE LIKELY FOLLOWING THE PASSING FROM THE SCENE OF MAO-TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI. UNTIL THEN THE USSR WILL LIKELY REMAIN THE PRIME IDEOLOGICAL AND NATIONAL ENEMY OF THE PRC.

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22. WHILE THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD LIKELY WELCOME THE PLAYING DOWN OF THE BORDER DISPUTE, IT IS CLEAR FROM SUCH INDICATIONS AS BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN MONGOLIA THAT THEY ARE NOT AVERSE TO BRINGIN THE ISSUE QUICKLY INTO PUBLIC FORA SHOULD THE SITUATION REQUIRE IT. THE PROSPECTS FOR AN EARLY START TO THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS CERTAINLY DO NOT LOOK ANY BRIGHTER FOLLOWING THE RECENT DIALOGUE. THE BALL IS BACK IN THE CHINESE COURT AS FAR AS THE SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED AND IT IS CLEAR BEFORE ANY IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED, THE CHINESE WILL HAVE TO MAKE THEMIMINAL GESTURE OF RELEASING THE IMPRIOSONED SOVIET HELICOPTER CREW.

23. IN SUM, THE RECENT EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES AND PRONOUNCEMENTS MAY HAVE EVEN HAD THE EFFECT OF INCREASING MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND ANTAGONISMS AND THE CHINESE FOR THEIR PART APPEAR TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS DESIRE NEITHER SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS NOR INDEED THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN MONGOLIA HAS NOW MARKED HIM AS THE ENEMY OF CHINA IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO. THE CHINESE HAD ALWAYS BEEN SUSPICIOUS THAT THE ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIOONS TO KOSYGIN IN HIS 1969 MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI
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HAD BEEN ALTERED IN AN ANTI-CHINESE WAY BY THE POLITBUROAND FOLLOWING HIS SPEECH IN ULAN BATOR THE CHINESE ARE NOW APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT BREZHNEV WAS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE.

24. FINALY THE CHINESE ARE ALSO SAYING THAT BREZHNEV HAD DELIBERATELY MISINTERPRETED THE 7TH NOVEMBER MESSAGE FROM PEKING. WHEN THE CHINESE SPOKE OF DISPUTED AREDH#TROOPS OF BOTH SIDES SHTJFHI#THEY WERE REFERRING ONLY TO TWO AREAS: THE DISUPUTED ISLANDS IN THE USSURI RIVER AND THAT AREA OF SINKIANG WHICH WAS THE TRADITIONAL

GRAZING LAND OF THE LOCAL NOMADIC PEOPLES. HOWEVER BREZHNEV
CHOSE TO INTERPRET "DISPUTED AREAS" AS MEANING ALL AREAS COVERED
BY "UNEQUAL TREATIES".THIS WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE
CHINESE ANDIF THE RUSSIANS INTERPRETED THEIR MESSAGE AS
DEMANDING IMPOSSIBLE PREVONDITIONS FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF
RELATIONS, IT WAS BECAUSE MOSCOW EID NOT WANT SERIOUD NEGOTIATIONS
NOR INDEED NORMALIZATION.

25. INTER-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS IN ANY EVENT ARE THE MOST
EMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, AND WITH A
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE COMING UP AND TH E SOVIET
DESIRE TO ORGANIZE-AGAINST THE WISH OF OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES-
A WORLD CONFERENCE WHICH HAS CLEARLY ANTI-CHINESE AIMS, IT SEEMS
UNLIKELY THAT MUCH PROGRESS, IF ANY, IS POSSIBLE ON THIS FRONT.

26. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A COMBINATION OF INTERNAL CHANGES
IN CHINA AND SOME ALTERATION OF THE GEO-POLITICAL BALANCE IN
THE WEST COULD CAUSE THE CHINESE TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO
EXPLORING RAPPROCHMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT IT WOULD
BE A FUNDAMENTAL RETREAT FOR CHINA TO DROP THE ANTI-SUPERPOWER
LINE AND ADOPT EITHER A PURELY ANTI-US STANCE OR A POLICY OF
CO-OPERATION WITH BOTH SUPERPOWERS. TO DO EITHER OF THESE
THINGS WOULD MEAN TO ABANDON THE EFFORT TO CRAVE OUT A CHINESE
WORLD ROLE DISTINCTIVE FROM THAT OF THE SUPERPOWERS AND
EFFECTIVELY TO DISCARD THE LEADERSHIP OF THE THIRD WORLD. THUS,
A CO-OPERATIVE, EXPEDIENT SINO-SOVIET ENTENTE COULD CONCEIVABLY
EMERGE ONLY IN THE FACE OF AN OVERRIDING NON-SOVIET THREAT TO
CHINA. LIKewise, A FRATERNAL PARTNERSHIP CONCEIVABLY COULD
BE RESTORED,BUTONLY IF THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO GRANT THE
PRC FULL EQUALITY OF LEADERSHIP IN EVERY ARENA, OR PERHAPS
ALTERNATIVELY TO OFFER A DIVISION OF AUTHORITY WITH THE SOVIETS
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HOLDING SWAY IN THE WEST AND THE CHINESE IN THE EAST. A SOVIET
WILLINGNESS TO DO EITHER OF THESE SEEMS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR
THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE.
END TEXT.

BRUCE

NOTE BY OCT: SECTION 4, USNATO 0024 AS RECEIVED;
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 JAN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Drafter: n/a
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Executive Order: 11652 GDS
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Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750188/abbrzhku.tel
Line Count: 533
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Review Authority: CunninFX
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